انديشمندان اجتماعي در باب هويت نظرات يكساني ندارند، برخي بر اين باورند كه هويت مفهمومي است براي شرح پاره اي مسائل اجتماعي(بروبيكر،2000)، در حالي كه گروهي ديگر بر آنند كه هويت هستة اصلي يكي از حياتي ترين مباحث دوران ماست( جنكينز،2004). و در اين ميانه براي تعيين و ارزيابي هويتهاي مختلف اجتماعي ملاكها ومعيارهاي متفاوت عرضه شده است. گروهي شباهتها (بروبيكر،2000) و عده اي ديگر تفاوتها (جنكينز،2004) را منشأ ظهور هويت اجتماعي مي دانند.

مقالة حاضر ضمن طرح مسأله وبيان آراء طرفين حامل اين پيام است كه: هويت در قلب مسائل اجتماعي جامعة بشري كنوني جاي دارد و هرچند در حال حاضر تفاوتهاي گروههاي مختلف اجتماعي باهم منشأ هويت قلمداد مي گردد، ظهور بحران هويت در جامعة جهاني كنوني نيز ناشي از همين تأكيد بر تفاوتهاست. دوران ما زمان مليت و مليت پرستي نيز نيست تا چه رسد به دامن زدن به تعصبات قومي ونژادي و مذهبي ما در حال حاضر در جهاني زندگي مي كنيم كه بشر تاكنون در آن نزيسته است ؛ عالم انساني. ديگر نمي توان در جهاني چنين گسترده و وابسته با پررنگ نمودن تفاوتهايي كه در جهان-عصرهاي پيشين رخ نموده اند، انسانها را از هم دور كرد وبه آن نام هويت داد. آدمي امروز به هويت انساني جهاني نياز دارد. نژاد: نوع بشر؛ وطن: كرة زمين . هيچ هويتي نازل تر از اين نمي تواند واقعيت موجود عالم انساني در جهان-عصر ما را به درستي توصيف نمايد. 

 

Introduction : By the beginning of twentieth century many people were known either as a member of a particular family, social group, as a citizen of their city or town, or they were recognized by their own professions or special activities such as Bishops, Carpenters, Smiths, etc,.  But, nowadays, we need so many identity cards to prove who we are and each card is suitable for a certain situation.  For example, one can not show one's passport for collecting cash from the bank or for borrowing books from the University Library. In today's time, many things have changed, and it has become evident that a crisis has arisen in connection with the matter of identity. This crisis might be factual; however, it is not the only reason in support of identity to be raised as a matter of interest in social, psychological, cultural, political, anthropological, ethnographical studies.
There are many debates among the scholars about identity, some are in agreement with it and strive to endorse that it could be regarded as a matter of fact in the modern world (Jenkins, 2004, p. 3), and others such as Brubaker (2000) believe that we can use some other alternatives for it, because it does not work as an independent concept in social studies.  Each individual knows who she/he is, and they also know, to some extend, who the others are, for example their relatives, friends, co-workers, neighbours, etc. Other members of society can be identified through common tactics in every day life (Williams, 2000, p. 2)
There are some other notions about identity which are considered identity to be problematic or a troublesome concept. Woodward (1997, p. 24) regards “new social movements” to be responsible for emerging identity crisis in the human life. He suggests that, regular political class loyalties were mistrusted by movements which cut across these separations and appealed to the particular identities of their sponsors. He continues to argue that: “Identity politics involve claiming one’s identity as a member of an oppressed or marginalized group as a political mobilization. Such politics involve celebration of a group’s uniqueness as well as analysis of its particular oppression.”  (Woodward, 1997, p24)
On the other hand, Giddens (1995, pp. 1-5) implies that modernity has to be blamed because of the identity crisis within industrialised world, since, it has brought doubt, new risks, and  mass media experience, through which the word has got an inexperienced appearance. He writes: this type of “lifestyle is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and global”, which leads individuals to negotiate lifestyle choices among a variety of alternatives.
Jenkins (2004, p. 7), despite all these debates, believes that “without identity there could be no human world”, while, Brubaker (2000, p. 34) suggests that identity is just an ‘analytical concept’.
This essay endeavours to state; identity is a matter of knowing human world; however it should be extended to include the issues of a universal human world. This struggle may turn out via efforts to divide the concept to two aspects, ontological and epistemological. In ontological part the focus will be on self and the main criteria of identification, differences and similarities. However there are many other issues could be considered. These two subjects are seen to be more common, and also related to each other and the other parts of the essay. In epistemological aspect, the essay tries to catch on some different notices. This part has different outline in compare with the ontological section.  
Notion of identity in social studies
Jenkins (2004, p. 4) refers to Oxford dictionary to find the meaning of identity and writes: “The notion of identity applies to the entire universe of creatures, things and substances, as well as to humans, and its general meanings are worth considering. The Oxford English Dictionary offers a Latin root-identitas from idem, ‘the same’- and two basic meanings” he goes on to specify these two aspects: “the sameness of objects…, and the consistency or continuity over time that is basis for establishing and grasping the definiteness and distinctiveness of something.” It is always practical to look up the root of a concept through dictionaries, since, it simply shows how historically the concept was used, and therefore, the root of a word seems not to be sufficient to construct a foundation for an innovative study, no matter how crucial it may be.  
Williams (2000, pp. 3-8), tries to establish a definition of identity, along with an indication of the limits of its use. Reviewing some literature, he counts “two different discourses in which the variety of meanings of identity are [is] expressed”; metaphysical and social. According to Williams (2000), the former refers to the question, “what or who a person is?” and the latter argues that, “what or who am I?” The question of the identity of the person as a social being is in accordance with the current debates. - However, due to the consciousness which is inserted in it, seems to be more accurate to employ social existent instead of social being.
Woodward (1997, p. 12) discusses about identity as essentialist claims about belongingness, and moves on to say that these claims are founded on nature and are often the essentialist form of history and the past. He, also, believes that identity is relational, and difference as mentioned earlier in this essay, which is established by symbolic marking in relation to others. Furthermore, Woodward (1997) argues that, identity is also conceptualized by social classificatory systems which show “how social relations are organized and divided”.
Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 4) consider two categories of employing the notion of identity; category of practice and category of analysis. Regarding some of its uses , they suggest that identity “bears a multivalent, even contradictory theoretical burden.” and prefer to classify identity as an analytical concept.
Seeking for an appropriate meaning to justify identity, Jenkins (2004, pp.1-6) describes that first of all, “all human identities are by definition social identities.” This is in agreement with Williams (2000) and the others who claim additional appropriate features for identity. He offers that identity is a process not just an event; and it is always an imperfect one which cannot be frozen. Jenkins (2004, p. 5) explains that “identity is a matter of knowing who is who (without which we can not know what is what). It is the systematic establishment and signification, between individuals, between collectivities, and between individuals and collectivities, of relationships of similarity and difference.”
The notion of identity in sociology is very close to the concept of quiddity in philosophy.  Generally, quiddity refers to the answer of “what is what?”, while, identity refers particularly to the essential aspect of human world, whereby the question of “who is who?” is answered.  So, it might be a proper point of departure, to begin with Jenkins’s question; “who is who?” wherein, two philosophical aspects can be recognized; epistemological and ontological; in another word, knowledge (the first who) or understanding as Jenkins (2004, p. 15) suggests and object which we want to know about (the second who).
Ontological aspect
Self
Whom do we try to know by the process of identification? There are a number of responses which require to be investigated.
Giddens (1995, p. 2) writes about self-identity by which he means some structuring features at the core of modernity which interact with the reflexivity of the self. Williams (2000, p. 6) reminds us of Goffman’s point of view and lists three types of identity which are: 1-‘personal identity’ 2-‘social identity’ 3-‘ego (or felt) identity’. It seems that personal and ego identity can be considered in psychology and the social identity deals with the social actors who engage with their roles by means of available templates for the organization and understanding of one another’s behavior in certain social situations.
In accordance with Oxford Dictionary, Jenkins (2004, p. 27) explains that the meaning of the word ‘self’ is parallel to the general meanings of ‘identity’.  He argues that these are “the core features of similarity, difference, reflexivity, and process". He suggests that personality and selfhood are complicated in each other. Furthermore, he maintains that in common sense, personality and selfhood are considered the same. After a vast epistemological discourse, he makes a conclusion about the role of self, mind, and identity; self is not only correlated with mind to be probable, but is also indispensable for identity.
Jenkins (2004, p. 16) as a pragmatic individualist  who prefers to talk about ‘empirical selves’, argues that, as “the individual and the collective are routinely entangled with each other”, and each catches it’s meaning from the other.  Therefore, the term “human world” wherein the collectivity and individual and their interactions are unified, can be regarded as the object of the process of identification.  His emphasis (2004, p. 50) is on “empirical selves” (selfhood) which means “the real people acting in the world”, who know everything about themselves.  They “embody mind and selfhood as points of view located in space and time, and they also address themselves and the others as persons. Finally, he emphasizes that person and self are not completely fit, although in every day speeches they are employed the same.
Person and personality are propounded in psychology and social psychology, where they mean human existent with all his/her characters which distinguish him/her from every other living beings. Personality is regarded as the cause of identity in social life and relationship. It is in psychology the criterion which alternate human being with human existent. (Birou, 1966, p. 264). Social personality, in this point of view is very similar to what Jenkins (2004) signifies by selfhood.  Goffman (quoted in Williams, 2000) also argues that, it seems that the distinction is that social personality is proposed when social structure and social templates are taken by granted or tolerable, while, selfhood and also human world -as are employed by Jenkins (2004) - represent a more empirical-critical sociology.
Using self within identity area leads to a contrast term of ‘the other’ and if self is applying as object to make the identity apparent then the boundaries between self and the others seems to be very significant. This issue suggests the other part of ontological aspect; similarity and difference.


Similarity and difference
 Stanford University Encyclopedia [online] proposes: “To say that things are identical is to say that they are the same. “Identity” and “sameness” mean the same; their meanings are identical.”  
Woodward (1997, p. 29) argues that: “identities are forged the marking of difference.”With hindsight to what has been quoted from Jenkins (2004, p. 4&5)  about difference and similarity assists to revive the discussion. There is a debate among the sociologists about the core of identity as a criterion for the process of identification; some of them believe that similarity is the most basic aspect and the others claim that difference is more essential.
Woodward (1997, p. 29) believes that marking of difference occurs through symbolic system of representation and types of social exclusion and consequently, identity depends on difference. In social system, he argues that, classification applies the notion of difference to make categories of self/others. He (1997, p. 36) claims that the most common forms that can make differences which are needed for identification, appear in ‘binary oppositions’ such as, High/Low; Sacred/Profane; Man/Woman; Educated/ Uneducated, etc, by which usually the norm is self and the other, the other.
Brubaker (2002, p. 163) denies the reality of groups and emphasizes on the sense of groupness.   He (2000, p. 14) argues that the core of identity is the interests of people which feel the similarities with the other members of the anticipated group. People are categorized by means of their interests. Brubaker (2000) believes that politics have such a power and also tendency to unify people, and he therefore, tries to put interests in unified categories for people, and persuade them to join the groups by growing sense of attachment. His notion seems to be more ideological and also political, even though he tries to make his idea to be reasonable, it remains far from tangible truth of the human world. His argument needs much more attention to real life, and his findings would have been more empirical and also real, if he had linked his work to similar surveys or/and researches
Jenkins (2004, p. 16) distinguishes between individual and collectives in the process of identification.  He believes that individuals' emphasis on differences need to be identified and “identity is about boundary process” (Jenkins, 2004, p. 102).  In contrast, collectives’ stress is on the similarities and that “collectivity means to have something in common” (Jenkins, 2004, p. 108). The procedure of identification for individual is supported by calling attention to boundaries and the collectives are identified by giving emphasis to symbolizing belongings. However, he endeavors to show that the process in both fields proceeds via interaction between similarities and differences.
It is important as Williams (2000, p. 55) suggests, to distinguish between two kinds of identification; first it is seen to be the result of a personal attempt to support the unity of the self in the midst of large quantity of possible identities. Next, identity is seen to be a “reflection of individual membership of particular social categories or collectivities.” Jenkins (2004) considers these respects and mobilizes his struggles to make a reasonable opinion with regards to this issue. Furthermore, it is essential to know: the extent of the proper points of view; the range of unity which is appropriately important. Also, are the people of a nation state or the believers of a particular religion, or a specific nationality, or even all humankind as citizens of one country (the Earth) identified? Therefore, it will be comprehensible how to put forward the identification; as was insisted in the case of Brubaker, this is not a scientific attitude it is more ideological one. As Brubaker (2000, p. 36) maintained, it is time to shift from current criteria for identification to a more extensive one.  He suggests that there is a need to move beyond identity, but it is seen that the perception of identity is accurate, although the range should be extended. Ethnicity; nationality; religious believes; family; gender; race; economy, and so on, are all inadequate to unify mankind as citizens of one country; the earth.
Epistemological aspect
The main questions in epistemology are: 1- What do we want to know? 2-how is our knowledge occurred? 3-what do we actually know?
Knowledge is somewhere between truth and our beliefs. However, not all of the beliefs which are fit with the truth are knowledge; the point is how the knowledge occurs.
  According to Plato, knowledge is a subset of that which is both true and believed

In accordance to the previous debates, what should be clear is the reality of selfhood which is significant through similarities and also differences, hence, the epistemological issues are proposed in this part of the essay.
Factual Data
One of the most important epistemological issues in every systematic subject is to support the notion by actual empirical facts. Many theories are not satisfactory due to the lack of this significant advantage. It is seen if Jenkins’s and also Brubaker’s visions were confirmed by empirical details they would be more sufficient and practical. It can replace the beliefs with knowledge. For instance if we look at (Jenkins, 2004, p. 44) where he is talking about what most of the people most of the times do; it is seen that the issue needs actual data to support the debate. How ever, Jenkins (2004, p. 30) suggests an epistemological problem with self and extension of the mind in Cohen’s argument. He explains that Cohen presupposed the existence of the other’s mind and misleads the debate to a metaphysical discussion which cannot be examined. According to Jenkins’s argue, every thing which cannot be examined and may assume as a presupposed matter should be shift to a more factual and empirical data.
I and Me
A significant issue might be about -I and me. It is not as maintained above, an empirical debate; in contrast, it seems more metaphysical or even, it might seem just a hermeneutic debate. As was mentioned earlier, I- is who is supposed to know.  I- is not an epistemological matter because, the subject of a sentence is an ontological issue. Nevertheless, it intends to know itself; then it is prohibited to know itself with respect to its subjectivity and all it can know is me which is the object; an epistemological matter. Therefore, an individual knows him/herself as an object and in the same way s/he knows the others as an object. In this way Jenkins’s (2004) claims that we know the others in the same way that we know ourselves, can be absolutely genuine. However, with respect to another epistemological issue it can be reconsidered.
Identity, Self and the Other
As a conclusion of the above argument, it looks as if when a particular person intend to know about him/her, s/he knows about his/her own mind, memories, feelings, happiness, sadness, aims and through knowledge by presence, while s/he plans to know about the others, s/he know these matters just through knowledge by representation.
In the former, the subject is united with the object, or rather they are one, and the reality of knowledge is this very unity. In this type of knowledge, there is no medium. Such unity culminates, on the one hand, in knowledge by presence comprehensively and completely conveying the objective reality, and in its untransferability on the other. By contrast, in knowledge by representation, the subject experiences another kind of relation to the object of knowledge which is linked to the presence of a medium in the subject’s mind, called "mental form." (Mesbah, A. 1998, online, access day 14/01/08)
As a result it is not entirely accurate that we can know the others by the same way we know ourselves, nonetheless, there might arise serious epistemological problems.
Subjectivity is a well-known issue in epistemology. How can I as a subject avoid subjectivity?  Identity is made noticeable and observable to I through symbols, cultural signs, rituals, the others' declarations about myself.  It is very difficult to avoid ethnocentrism, selfishness, and other human weaknesses, it gives the impression that a systematic methodology should be considered to make the identity closer to what in its actual fact is. (See Plato’s chart on page 6)  
Imperfect Identity
Identity is regarded as a process (Jenkins, 2004, p. 5); so therefore, it is continually an imperfect matter, how far I can make it visible?
How can the object which is the same one we started to identify yesterday, stand out? An appropriate answer of the first question in a scientific approach is that it might be possible as far as we apply a systematic, empirical methodology.  Whilst the second question, has not a proper answer through a scientific speech and it can be discussed in a philosophical manner.  I as a subject knows him/herself through his/her memories and a self-consciousness (which is another epistemological issue) but, what about the others? As it is considered before, I can not know the other in the same way that he/she knows him/herself.
Is identification a 'salad burnet' concept?  Is it proper to say, someone’s identity is more than the others? If yes, what aspect of identity is so?  If no, then does -I know every thing about him/her, or the others?  It seems that if identity is what the I can make visible about him/her or the others in a perpetual process, and identity is imperfect, it can be also respected as a 'salad burnet' concept. However, it looks as if is not supported with every day experiences, consequently, it is amongst all the beliefs which are required to be investigated through an empirical research method.
A proper answer to every other question in epistemological area which asks about how (both to avoid and to achieve) is a classic modest one: Through a systematic methodological research.
Last discussion
“Identity is a matter of knowing who’s who?” (Jenkins, R. 2004, p. 5)
Identity as applied in this essay- which is in some aspects very close to Jenkins’s opinion (2004) is a "concept through which the researcher can be conscious of human world as selfhood", which is an empirical existence who is in reaction with him/her, individuals, collectivities, and is aware of all of these activities. This self is an ontological matter, which, as a subject can know, but cannot be known; however, it can be known as an object; me. Applying two different types of knowledge (knowledge by presence and knowledge by representation), epistemologically, the way others are identified is different from the way through which self is identified for her/him. However, ontologically, the self is identified for itself as an object is the same as the others. Identification is the process which produces selfhood, both individually and collectively. This procedure occurs via differences and similarities.
 Most significant criteria of similarity and/or difference are typically relevant in identifying people. As a result of this essay, which has ontological dimensions, is close to what Jenkins (2004) offers.  Both similarities and differences are important for this matter; however, the purpose of identification determines the method at the ultimate analysis. Unifying the people leads to similarities and allocating them, directs to differences, politics and ideologies are the major sources for featuring the above purpose.
To avoid many epistemological problems which are raised within practical field, the researcher should apply a systematic methodological empirical research, both to support the ideas with the actual facts and to avoid subjectivity and other epistemological issues.
Consequently, there are two prefaces which can make identity as a matter of sociological research.
1-    Human world needs to be identified.
2-    Identification is possible.
It is true that the whole about human world which is essential to be known cannot be identified.  But, under specific conditions identifying works, consequently, identity is, and should be in progress. However, as to the extent that the human word increasingly changes the face of our world and the requirements of human life are completely different from even the last years of twentieth century, identity is assumed to adopt with this changeable universe.   
Identity is in the ‘circuit’ of our social life and ‘inextricably entangled’ with it. It seems we are obliged to accept Williams’ (2000, p. 42) perception and continue towards the “project of identity”.
Reflections on further studies
There are 157 titles which match with the word identity, found just in Sheffield University Library, without even considering the articles and journals. They cover many fields of studies, such as; sociology, anthropology, ethnography, psychology, political science, philosophy, law, and etc.
In many of the above areas identity is applied, to add to human knowledge in, women studies, globalization, criminology, human right, minorities, refugees, immigration, children, language, ethnicity and ethnocentrism, and so on.
Hetherington (1998, p. 21) describing about contemporary world, suggests that identity can be applied to increase our knowledge about alienation or role conflict, and even identity crisis.
But some topic suggestions and awareness outlined in this domain might be:
•    Embodiment and identity can be considered a practical field which Jenkins (2004) has already started it.
•    Social identity and continuity, which is based on the imperfect identity, can be followed as a practical area.
•    Identity after death, which is proposed by Jenkins (2004, p. 3) can be a novel field in this territory.
•    Self studies both epistemological and ontological are required to be done, but inside the practical fields not just in the mind of sociologists.
•    Culture and identity is another title which has a proper situation in practice.
•    Changing the identity is another matter can be considered as a beneficial research.
•    Although it appears that crisis of identity is exceeded, since is an actual puzzle, it deserves to be accomplished even more.
•    There is a serious threat of subjectivity in all human studies areas, identity is not an exception, and on the contrary, it is a field which is filled with subjective risk as maintained before. Applying a systematic methodological research can be beneficial to prevent moderately this peril.
•     Since, identity is a multi-field study; hence, it is vital for the investigators to have a general knowledge in other fields such as psychology, anthropology, and philosophy, or even improved to work through a team.

Bibliography
Birou, A. (1987). Vocabulaire Pratique des Sciences Socials. Tehran: Keihan.
Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity without Group. Arch.Eyro.Social , 163-189.
Brubaker, R., & Cooper, f. (2000). Beyond Identity. Theory and society , 29 (1), 1-47.
Cohen, A. P. (1994). Self Consciousness. London: ROUTLEDGE.
Giddens, A. (1995). Modernity and Self-Identity. London: Polity Press.
Jenkins, R. (2004). Social Identity (second ed.). London: ROUTLEDGE.
Mesbah, A. (1998). Subject-Object Relation in Mullâ Sadrâ’s. In K. Jaspers (Ed.), Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Boston: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy.
Weedon, C. (2004). Identity and Culture. Berkshire: Open University.
Williams, R. (2000). Making Identity Matter. Durham: sociologypress.
Woodward, K. (1997). Identity And Difference. London: Open University.

 HYPERLINK http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity  
  HYPERLINK "http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/